A paraconsistent logic is a logic which allows non-trivial inconsistent theories. One of the oldest and best known approaches to the problem of designing useful paraconsistent logics is da Costa's approach, which seeks to allow the use of classical logic whenever it is safe to do so, but behaves completely differently when contradictions are involved. da Costa's approach has led to the family of Logics of Formal (In)consistency (LFIs). In this paper we provide non-deterministic semantics for a very large family of first-order LFIs (which includes da Costa's original system C * 1 , as well as thousands of other logics). We show that our semantics is effective and modular, and we use this effectiveness to derive some important properties of logics in this family.
Introduction
The concept of paraconsistency was introduced more than half a century ago, when several philosophers questioned the validity of classical logic with regard to its ex contradictione quodlibet (ECQ) principle. According to this counterintuitive principle, any proposition can be inferred from any inconsistent set of assumptions. Now the philosophical objections to this principle have recently been reinforced by practical considerations concerning information systems. Classical logic simply fails to capture the fact that information systems which contain some inconsistent pieces of information may produce useful answers to queries. The obvious conclusion from this state of affairs is that a more appropriate logic is needed for such systems. Thus [15] says:
Informally speaking, paraconsistency is the paradigm of reasoning in the presence of inconsistency. Classical logic intolerantly invalidates any useful reasoning if there is any inconsistency, no matter how irrelevant it may be. However, inconsistencies, as unpleasant and dangerous as they can be, are ubiquitous in information systems. For novel technology which often is not sufficiently mature before being launched on the market, the risk of inconsistencies is even higher. Hence, a thoroughly revised inconsistency-tolerant logic is needed for databases and information systems, also because many future applications (e.g., the self-organizing cognitive evolution of networked information systems, involving negotiation, argumentation, diagnosis, learning, etc.) are likely to deal directly with inconsistencies as inherent constituents of real-life situations.
It turned out that one encounters severe complications when moving (in the context of LFIs) from the propositional level to the first-order one. They are mostly related to the lack of the IPE principle (intersubstitutability of provable equivalents) in LFIs. This is an important principle of classical logic, according to which ψ(A) ↔ ψ(B) is provable whenever A ↔ B is provable. Unfortunately this principle does not hold for the family of LFIs studied in this paper (see [10, 11] ). For instance, already on the propositional level one usually cannot infer ¬(A ∧ B) ↔ ¬(B ∧ A) from A ∧ B ↔ B ∧ A. This abnormality becomes really harmful on the first-order level. Even the α-conversion principle (identifying syntactic objects differing only in the names of their bound variables) does not hold in the first-order systems which are obtained from the propositional LFIs considered here by the addition of the usual rules and axioms for ∀ and ∃. Thus although ∀xp(x) ↔ ∀yp(y) is provable in these systems, ¬∀xp(x) ↔ ¬∀yp(y) is not. This is of course unacceptable in any reasonable logical system. A similar problem occurs concerning vacuous quantification: although ∀x∀yp(x) ↔ ∀xp(x) is provable, ¬∀x∀yp(x) ↔ ¬∀xp(x) is not.
The straightforward solution to this problem proposed by da Costa ( [12, 13] ) is to add an explicit axiom capturing the principles of α-equivalence and vacuous quantification. However, the non-deterministic semantics for systems with such axioms become more complicated. As a result, their effectiveness becomes less evident. Nevertheless, we shall be able to prove the effectiveness of our semantics for all the first-order LFIs studied in this paper. Then we show how this effectiveness can be used in order to prove important proof-theoretical properties of those LFIs.
Preliminaries
Notation: Given a first-order language L, F rm L is its set of wffs, F rm cl L -its set of sentences and T rm cl L -its set of closed terms.
) is the set of variables occurring free in a formula ψ (a term t). ψ{t/x} the formula obtained from ψ by substituting the term t for every free occurrence of x in ψ. For a set V, denote by P + (V) the set of all non-empty subsets of V.
The following definition formalizes for first-order languages the notion of a substitution of subformulas in a sentence.
Definition 1 (Substitutable subformulas) Given a sentence ψ of L, the set SSF (ψ) of its substitutable subformulas is inductively defined as follows:
Denote by ϕ(ψ) an L-sentence ϕ, such that ψ ∈ SSF (ϕ). Let ϕ(ψ) and θ be L-sentences. We denote by ϕ(θ) the result of substituting θ for ψ in ϕ.
For capturing the principles of α-conversion and void quantifiers, we need the notion of a congruence relation.
Definition 2 (Congruence relation) Given a first-order language L, a binary relation ∼ between L-formulas is a congruence relation if (i) ∼ is an equivalence relation, (ii) If ψ 1 ∼ ϕ 1 , ..., ψ n ∼ ϕ n then (ψ 1 , ..., ψ n ) ∼ (ϕ 1 , ..., ϕ n ) for every n-ary connective of L, and (iii) If ψ ∼ ϕ then Qxψ ∼ Qxϕ for Q ∈ {∀, ∃}.
A Taxonomy of first-order LFIs
Let L + cl be a first-order language with the propositional connectives {∧, ∨, ⊃} and the quantifiers {∀, ∃}. L cl is the language obtained from L + cl by extending its set of propositional connectives with the unary connective ¬. L C is the language obtained from L cl by the addition of the unary connective •.
Definition 3 Let HCL
+ be some (propositional) Hilbert-type system which has Modus Ponens as the sole inference rule, and is sound and strongly complete for the positive fragment of CP L (classical propositional logic). The first-order system HCL + F OL over L + cl is obtained from it by adding the following axioms:
where t is any term free for x in ψ, and the following inference rules:
where t is free for x in ψ and x ∈ F v[ϕ].
Remark: It can be shown that HCL + F OL is an axiomatization of the negationfree fragment of classical first-order logic (in fact, a proof of this can be extracted from the proof of theorem 24 below).
Definition 4
The system QB 0 is obtained from HCL + F OL by adding the schemata:
Remark: It is not difficult to provide semantics for QB 0 . However, in this paper we concentrate on da Costa's systems, which include the additional explicit axiom (mentioned in the introduction) for capturing the principles of α-conversion and of vacuous quantifiers. For this purpose we define the following congruence relation between L-formulas:
L is the minimal congruence relation between L-formulas, which satisfies:
In other words, ψ ∼ dc L ψ if ψ can be obtained from ψ by renaming of bound variables and/or deletion/addition of void quantifiers.
Definition 6
The system QB is obtained from QB 0 by adding the schema ψ ⊃ ψ , where ψ ∼ dc L C ψ .
Next we obtain a large family of first-order systems by adding different combinations of the following schemata, studied in the literature of LFIs (see, e.g. [10, 11, 8] ).
Definition 7 Let
Ax be the set consisting of the following schemata:
is the system obtained by adding the schemata in X to QB.
The set Ax consists of the following schemata: and (x 2 ) are in X for x ∈ {i, k}, we abbreviate it by x. Also, if x y is in X for every y ∈ {⊃, ∧, ∨} and some x ∈ {a, o, v}, we shall write x p . Similarly, if x y is in X for every y ∈ {∀, ∃} and some x ∈ {a, o, v}, we shall write x Q . For both x p and x Q we shall write x.
Remark: Denote by QC 1 the system QBlcia. If we take •ψ to be an abbreviation of ¬(ψ ∧ ¬ψ), then QC 1 becomes da Costa's original system C * 1 from [12, 13] . 4 Note that C * 1 is over the language of {¬, ∨, ∧, ⊃, ∀, ∃}.
Non-deterministic Matrices
Our main semantic tool in what follows will be the following generalization of the concept of a multi-valued matrix given in [1, 2, 3, 22, 21] . 
where D is a (non-empty) domain and I is a function interpreting constants, predicate symbols and function symbols of L, satisfying the following conditions:
is an n-ary predicate, and
an n-ary function. I is extended to interpret closed terms of L as follows:
Here a note on our treatment of quantification in the framework of Nmatrices is in order. The standard approach to interpreting first-order formulas is by using objectual (or referential) semantics, where the variable is thought of as ranging over a set of objects from the domain (see. e.g. [16, 17] ). An alternative approach is substitutional quantification ( [18] ), where quantifiers are interpreted substitutionally, i.e. a universal (an existential) quantification is true if and only if every one (at least one) of its substitution instances is true (see. e.g. [20, 14] ). [22] explains the motivation behind choosing the substitutional approach for the framework of Nmatrices, and points out the problems of the objectual approach in this context. The substitutional approach assumes that every element of the domain has a term referring to it. Thus given a structure S = D, I , we extend the language L with individual constants, one for each element of D.
is the language obtained from L by adding to it the set of individual constants {a | a ∈ D}. S = D, I is the L(D)-structure, such that I is an extension of I satisfying:
Given an L-structure S = D, I , we shall refer to the extended L(D)-structure D, I as S and to I as I when the meaning is clear from the context.
Next we define the congruence relation ∼ S , which is the semantic counterpart of the syntactic congruence relation ∼ dc L (see defn. 5).
is defined inductively as follows:
The relation ∼ S between formulas of L(D) is the minimal congruence relation, satisfying:
, where x, y are distinct variables and z is a new variable, then Qxψ ∼ S Qyϕ for Q ∈ {∀, ∃}.
The proofs of the following two easy lemmas are left for the reader:
Lemma 13 Let S = D, I be an L-structure.
2. Let A, B be two L-sentences (where no individual constants occur), such that for any two closed terms t 1 = t 2 occurring in A and B respectively:
Remark: The difference between ∼ dc L and ∼ S is as follows:
S identifies two sentences ψ, ψ such that ψ is obtained from ψ by substituting any number of closed terms for closed terms with the same denotation in S. For instance, let S be an L-structure, such that
The motivation for this is purely technical and is related to extending the language with the set of individual constants {a | a ∈ D}. Suppose we have a closed term t, such that I[t] = a ∈ D. But a also has an individual constant a referring to it. We would like to be able to substitute t for a in every context, as will be shown in the sequel.
Definition 15 Let S = D, I be an L-structure for an Nmatrix M.
The consequence relation M between sets of L-sentences and L-sentences is defined as follows:
An Nmatrix M is a characteristic Nmatrix for S if it is sound and complete for S.
The following is an extension of defn. 2.9 and theorem 2.10 from [3] to first-order languages:
for every n-ary connective of L and every
for Q ∈ {∀, ∃} and every y ∈ V 1 and
for Q ∈ {∀, ∃} and every H ⊆ P + (V 1 ).
Proof: a straightforward extension of the proof of theorem 2.10 from [3] .
Effectiveness of first-order Nmatrices
One of the most important properties of the semantic framework of Nmatrices is its effectiveness, in the sense that for determining whether Γ M ϕ (where M is an Nmatrix) it always suffices to check only partial valuations, defined only on subformulas of Γ ∪ {ϕ}.
is closed under subformulas if it satisfies the following conditions:
-For every n-ary connective : ψ 1 , ..., ψ n ∈ W S whenever (ψ 1 , ..., ψ n ) ∈ W S . -For Q ∈ {∀, ∃} and every a ∈ D: ψ{a/x} ∈ W S whenever Qxψ ∈ W S . 
Definition 18
Proof: Let S be an L-structure and let W S be a set of L(D)-sentences, closed under subformulas. Let v p be some partial S-valuation on W S which is legal in M. We show that it can be extended to a full S-valuation v which is legal in M. For every n-ary connective of L and every a 1 , ..., a n ∈ V, choose a truth-value b a1,...,an ∈˜ [a 1 , ..., a n ]. For Q ∈ {∀, ∃} of L and every B ⊆ P + 
Note that the above definition does not depend on the choice of ϕ if such ϕ exists, and so χ is well-defined. Next define
The proof that v is legal in M is not difficult and is left to the reader. Obviously, v is an extension of v p .
Non-deterministic semantics for first-order LFIs

Finite non-deterministic semantics
In this section we provide five-valued (or less) non-deterministic semantics for first-order LFIs obtained from the basic system QB by adding various combinations of schemata from Ax (not including the schemata (l), (b) and (d). We deal with systems including these schemata in the next subsection). The semantics presented below is an extension to first-order languages of the semantics from [3] .
The system QB treats the connectives ∧, ∨, ⊃ and the quantifiers ∀, ∃ similarly to classical logic. The treatment of • and ¬ is different: intuitively, the truth/falsity of ¬ψ or •ψ is not completely determined by the truth/falsity of ψ. More data is needed for it. The central idea is to include all the relevant data concerning a sentence ψ in the truth-value from V which is assigned to ψ. In our case the relevant data beyond the truth/falsity of ψ is the truth/falsity of ¬ψ and of •ψ. This leads to the use of elements from {0, 1}
3 as truth-values, where the intended meaning of v[ψ] = x, y, z is as follows:
However, the axioms (t) and (b) rule out some of the truth-values. By (t), at least one of the sentences ψ, ¬ψ should be true, thus ruling out 0, 0, 1 and 0, 0, 0 . Similarly, (b) rules out 1, 1, 1 . We are left with the following five truth-values:
The following is an extension of defn. 3.1 from [3] to first-order languages:
The operations in O are defined as follows:
Note that the non-deterministic truth tables in QM 5 corresponding to the operations ¬ and • are:
Proof: This follows from the suitability of QM 5 for ∼ S , and proposition 21.
The following theorem is a generalization of theorem 3 of [21] .
Theorem 24 (Soundness and completeness) Let Γ ∪ {ψ} be a set of L Csentences. Γ QB ψ iff Γ QM5 ψ.
The proof of soundness is not hard and is left to the reader. For completeness, suppose that Γ QB ψ 0 . We will construct an L C -structure S and an QM 5 -legal S-valuation v, such that S, v |= M5 Γ , but S, v |= QM5 ψ 0 . It is easy to see that we can restrict ourselves to L r , the subset of L consisting of all the constants, function and predicate symbols occurring in Γ ∪ {ψ}. Let L be the language obtained from L r by adding a countably infinite set of new constants. It is a standard matter to show (using a usual Henkin-type construction) that Γ can be extended to a maximal set Γ * in L , such that:
Note that the last property follows from property 3 and the fact that for any
is provable in the positive fragment of first-order classical logic (and so also in QB). Let ψ, ϕ, and ∀xθ be L -sentences. It is easy to show that Γ * has the following properties:
The L -structure S = D, I is defined as follows:
-D is the set of all the closed terms of L .
where x, y, z ∈ {0, 1} and:
Lemma 25 I * [t] = t for every t ∈ D.
Proof: by induction on t.
Note that in the extended language L (D) we now have an individual constant t for every term t ∈ D. For any L -term t, define t as follows:
Given an L (D)-sentence ψ, define the sentence ψ inductively as follows:
In other words, ψ is obtained by replacing all individual constants t occurring in ψ for the respective (closed) term t. 
where x ψ , y ψ , z ψ ∈ {0, 1} and:
and so v respects the ∼ S relation. It remains to check that v respects the interpretations of the connectives and quantifiers in QM 5 . This is guaranteed by the properties of Γ * . We prove this for the cases of • and ∀: 
Suppose by contradiction that v[∀xψ] ∈ F. Then ∀x ψ ∈ Γ * . By property 8 of Γ * , for every t ∈ Γ * : ψ{t/x} ∈ Γ * . Then v[ ψ{t/x}] ∈ D. Similarly to the previous case, we get that v[ψ{a/x}] ∈ D for every a ∈ D, in contradiction to our assumption.
Now we turn to the semantics of the first-order systems obtained from the basic system QB by adding various combinations of the schemata from Ax. The main idea is modularity: each schema induces some semantic condition, leading to a certain refinement of the basic Nmatrix QM 5 .
Definition 27
The refining conditions induced by the schemata from Ax are:
Definition 28 For X ⊆ Ax, let QM 5 (X) be the weakest simple refinement (see defn. 16) of QM 5 , in which the conditions of the schemata from X are satisfied. In other words, QM 5 (X) = V X , D X , O X , where:
-If both (e) and (w) are in X, then I is deleted.
-V X is the set of values from {t, f, t I , f I , I} which are not deleted either by a combination of both (e) and (w), or by any condition of a schema from X.
-For any connective and any a 1 , ..., a n ∈ V X ,˜ QM5(X) assigns to a the set of all truth-values in˜ QM5 which are not forbidden by any condition of a schema from X. -For Q ∈ {∀, ∃} and any H ⊆ P + (V X ),Q QM5(X) assigns to a the set of all
O is defined by:
This is defined like QM 3 l, except that ∧ is defined as follows:
Theorem 32 (Soundness and completeness) Let Γ ∪ {ψ} be a set of L Csentences. For y ∈ {l, d, b}, Γ QBy ψ iff Γ QM3y ψ.
Proof: We do the proof for the case of QBl. The proofs in the other two cases are similar. Soundness: Define the function F : T ∪ I ∪ F → {t, I, f } as follows:
The Nmatrices QM 3 d(X) and QM 3 b(X) are defined similarly.
Remark: it is easy to see that for any X ⊆ Ax and y ∈ {(l), (d), (b)}, the set of conditions in X is coherent, the interpretations of the connectives and the quantifiers of QM 3 y(X) never return empty sets and so QM 3 y(X) is welldefined.
Theorem 34 (Soundness and completeness) Let Γ ∪ {ϕ 0 } be a set of L Csentences. Let X ⊆ Ax and y ∈ {l, d, b}. Then Γ QBy[X] ϕ 0 iff Γ QM3y(X) ϕ 0 .
Proof: It is easy to show that QM 3 y(X) is a (simple) refinement of QM 3 (X) and so by theorem 1, QM3(X) ⊆ QM3y(X) . It is also easy to check that for any schema in X, the relevant condition guarantees its validity in QM 3 y(X), and so soundness follows. The proof of completeness is a straightforward extension of the proof of theorem 32.
Proof: It can be easily checked that the only difference between the Nmatrices QM 3 lcia and QM 3 lca is in their interpretation of •.
Corollary 36 Let L be the •-free fragment of L C . Let the Nmatrix QM 3 C * 1 for L be obtained from the Nmatrix QM 3 lcia for L C (or QM 3 lca) by discarding the interpretation of •. Then QM 3 C * 1 is a characteristic Nmatrix for C *
.
Proof: similar to the proof of theorem 34. (Another alternative is to use a translation of C Remark: da Costa's C 1 is usually considered to be the •-free analogue of the propositional fragment of QBlcia (called Cila in [8, 11] ). However, from the above corollaries it follows that it is equally justified to identify it with Cla, the propositional fragment of QBlca. A similar observation applies to C
Logical indistinguishability in first-order LFIs
In this section we apply the framework of Nmatrices and in particular their effectiveness property to prove a very important proof-theoretical property of the first-order LFIs investigated here.
Definition 38 Let S be a system which includes the positive classical logic. Two sentences A and B are logically indistinguishable in S if ϕ(A) S ϕ(B) and ϕ(B) S ϕ(A) for every sentence ϕ(ψ) in the language of S.
Theorem 39 Let S be a system over a first-order language L which includes {¬, ⊃}. If one of the following holds, then two sentences A, B are logically indistinguishable in S iff A ∼ dc L B:
1. QBbcia p wv Q is an extension of S. 2. QBbcia p ev Q is an extension of S. 
